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The central command of corporate governance law is that directors 
must serve the shareholder interest.  Directors may not sacrifice 
shareholder value in favor of other corporate stakeholders or other 
interests.  In this Article, I examine whether this rule of shareholder 
primacy is mandatory, or merely a default rule which can be altered 
through private ordering.  I argue that Delaware’s corporate law, the most 
important corporate law in the United States, should be understood to have 
long-permitted privately-ordered deviation from shareholder primacy.  This 
assessment, however, is at least complicated by the recent legislative 
creation of the Public Benefit Corporation (PBC).  The PBC is a new form 
of business organization that explicitly charges directors with balancing the 
interests of shareholders and non-shareholders in corporate operations.  
The PBC innovation may lead judges to conclude that if corporate 
promoters want to deviate from shareholder primacy, they must do so by 
using the Public Benefit Corporation.  The organizational and governance 
requirements of the PBC are highly particular, and most of its important 
features are mandatory.  My claim is that the Public Benefit Corporation 
may inadvertently have narrowed flexibility in the creation of corporations 
that alter the shareholder primacy norm, rather than expanded it, as the 
PBC’s proponents and many commentators have presumed.  
A more desirable interpretation, however, is that private-ordering of 
corporate beneficiary is still permitted under the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, and that the PBC is merely one alternative structure – a 
non-exclusive “menu option” – which promoters seeking alternatives to 
shareholder wealth maximization might find convenient to use.  I urge 
judges to adopt this second interpretation, and I urge Delaware lawmakers 
to clarify their intentions to avoid jurists adopting the view that the PBC is 
the exclusive path to multi-stakeholder governance.   
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The central command of corporate governance law is that directors must 
serve the shareholder interest.
2
  Directors may not sacrifice shareholder 
value in favor of other corporate stakeholders or other interests.  In this 
Article, I examine whether this rule of shareholder primacy is mandatory, or 
merely a default rule which can be altered through private ordering.  I argue 
that Delaware’s corporate law, the most important corporate law in the 
United States, should be understood to have long-permitted privately-
ordered deviation from shareholder primacy.
3
  This assessment, however, is 
at least complicated by the recent legislative creation of the Public Benefit 
Corporation (PBC).  The PBC is a new form of business organization that 
explicitly charges directors with balancing the interests of shareholders and 
non-shareholders in corporate operations.  The PBC innovation may lead 
judges to conclude that if corporate promoters want to deviate from 
shareholder primacy, they must do so by using the Public Benefit 
Corporation.  The organizational and governance requirements of the PBC 
are highly particular, and most of its important features are mandatory.  My 
claim is that the Public Benefit Corporation may inadvertently have 
narrowed flexibility in the creation of corporations that alter the shareholder 
primacy norm, rather than expanded it, as the PBC’s proponents and many 
commentators have presumed.
4
       
A more desirable interpretation, however, is that private-ordering of 
corporate beneficiary is still permitted under the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, and that the PBC is merely one alternative structure – a 
non-exclusive “menu option” – which promoters seeking alternatives to 
shareholder wealth maximization might find convenient to use.  I urge 
                                                 
2
 See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 181 
(2013) (demonstrating that the law of Delaware really is shareholder primacy, and 
critiquing the arguments of scholars who doubt this).   But see LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012) (insisting that shareholder primacy is not the law).     
3
 Corporate law scholarship lamentably uses the phrase “shareholder primacy” in two 
distinct senses.  Sometimes the phrase is used to describe the goal of corporate governance 
(i.e., firms should serve the shareholder interest), but other times it is used to describe the 
means of corporate governance (i.e., shareholders should have a significant say in how 
firms are run).  I think the phrase should be used exclusively to refer to the goal of 
corporate governance, and that is the only sense in which I use the phrase in this article. 
4
 See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit 
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345 (2014). 




judges to adopt this second interpretation, and I urge Delaware lawmakers 
to clarify their intentions to avoid jurists adopting the view that the PBC is 
the exclusive path to multi-stakeholder governance.   
The issue of whether and how corporate purpose can be altered is likely 
to soon emerge in important areas of social contest.  First, there appears to 
be a real desire among some entrepreneurs, investors, workers, and 
consumers to make use of hybrid forms that fall between the polar extremes 
of profit-maximizing firms and non-profit ones.  Such adventurers want to 
know what is possible and want is forbidden in the design of alternative 
entities.  Uncertainty will impede broad experimentation, and, where 
experimentation is undertaken in the face of such uncertainty, costly and 
disruptive litigation will lurk, and strike.      
 
Ambiguity in this area is likely to trouble small-scale, under-lawyered 
socially conscious ventures, and it may also bedevil some behemoths.  
When Facebook, Inc., first went public in 2012, the Registration Statement 
it filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission included a “Letter 
from Mark Zuckerberg,” the company founder, and (then) 27-year old Chair 
of Facebook’s Board of Directors.  The letter reads as a warning that 
Facebook has a “mission” that is not limited to serving the shareholders:   
Facebook was not originally created to be a company. It was built 
to accomplish a social mission — to make the world more open 
and connected.  We think it’s important that everyone who invests 
in Facebook understands what this mission means to us, how we 
make decisions and why we do the things we do.  
. . . 
Simply put: we don’t build services to make money; we make 
money to build better services. . . . These days I think more and 
more people want to use services from companies that believe in 
something beyond simply maximizing profits.
5
 
If this is not just puffery, Zuckerberg and his appointees may be 
confused about their legal obligations, or may at least be confusing their 
investors and the public about it.
6
  Suppose two companies, say Apple and 




toc287954_10 (hereinafter, “Facebook Registration Statement”). 
6
 Facebook went public with a dual class structure in which Zuckerberg retained a 
dominate share of voting stock, while the public was offered non-voting stock.  Some 
analysts suggest that Facebook shareholders have essentially agreed to go along with 






 undertook a bidding war for Facebook, and Zuckerberg 
privileged a lower Apple bid because he believed Apple would make great 
products with Facebook’s assets, unlike The Circle, which he thought 
would just focus on profits.  Has Zuckerberg violated his fiduciary 
obligation to Facebook’s shareholders?  Of course he has.  Facebook is a 
Delaware corporation, and the fiduciary obligations of Delaware directors 
cannot be altered through letters in registration statements.
8
  But this Article 
suggests that Zuckerberg, and corporate promotors who share the idea of 
putting the social mission of a business before (or alongside) profits, could 
have operationalized this mission through a Delaware corporation, and still 
can, without having to make use of the highly restrictive Public Benefit 
Corporation form. 
Collateral areas of social policy are also newly attentive to the question 
of corporate purpose.  For example, in the controversial 2014 case of 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,
9
 the United States Supreme Court held that under 
the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Hobby Lobby 
corporation was entitled to an exemption from certain commands of the 
America Cares Act, because the statute substantially burdened the firm’s 
sincerely held religious beliefs.
10
  The government had argued that Hobby 
Lobby could not hold religious beliefs, because it was a business 
corporation whose sole lawful purpose was to make money for 
shareholders.  The Supreme Court, however, credited board resolutions and 
public statements of the firm as evidence of its religiosity.  Hobby Lobby is 
a closely held family corporation, and none of its shareholders objected to 
                                                                                                                            
Zuckerberg’s ride, wherever he chooses to go.  But as a legal matter the fact that 
Facebook’s shareholders have no voice in corporate governance would make it even more 
important to impose strict fiduciary obligations on the directors, since shareholders cannot 
protect themselves through corporate democracy.   
7
 In his dystopian novel, THE CIRCLE (2014), Dave Eggers imagines the emergence of a 
corporation that dwarfs the combined influence of Google, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon.  
It maintains Facebook’s databases, purchased for billions of dollars, as a deep archive of its 
users’ personal histories and predilections.  Id. 
8
 And make no mistake, the hypothetical here is posed as a “last period” problem only to 
starkly express the issue.  If Facebook is forbidden from sacrificing profits in the public 
interest when selling the company, it is just as surely forbidden from doing so in the 
ordinary course of business (although it may, of course, conclude that operational restraint 
in the short-term is better for the shareholders in the long-term).  See Yosifon, The Law of 
Corporate Purpose, supra note __ at 219-223 (clarifying that while under Delaware law 
directors of going-concerns enjoy total discretion to determine what is the most profitable 
time horizon in which to maximize returns to shareholders, they have no discretion at all  
regarding whether or not to pursue the most profitable course).     
9
 134 S. CT. 2751 (2014). 
10
 134 S. CT. 2751 (2014). 




the board’s claims.  But what would have been the result if a shareholder 
had objected, given the absence of religious specification in the corporate 
charter?  The issue was dodged in Hobby Lobby, but in other similar cases 
the question of whether and how a firm can opt-out of shareholder primacy 
will surely become central.  
 
These kinds of questions are likely to come up, as firms struggle with 
how to structure non-standard organizations, and governments struggle with 
how to regulate them.  The world has a funny way of presenting facts that 
the law is least able to deal with in simple deductive fashion.  After 
developing my arguments about the relationship between ordinary corporate 
law and public benefit corporations, I call for and suggest paths towards 
judicial and legislative clarification, as well as broader reforms.
11
 
II.   ALTERING THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY DEFAULT RULE  
 
Front-Loading a Private-Ordering Anti-Climax 
  Regardless of whether privately-ordered, idiosyncratic deviation from 
shareholder primacy can be achieved through the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, it could surely be accomplished through the use of a 
Limited Liability Company (LLC) statute.
12
  Delaware’s LLC law explicitly 
                                                 
11
 See infra Section IV.  In the course of this assessment, I make use of and contribute to 
longstanding doctrinal and normative debates about the desirability of mandatory or 
mutable rules in corporate law. See e.g., Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A 
Political and Economic Analysis, 85 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 542 (1990); Henry N. 
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Jeffery N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure 
of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure 
of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989); Roberto Romano, Answering the 
Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
(1989).  Those debates, prominent in the late-1980’s and early-1990s, did not address the 
question of corporate beneficiary.  This literature has in recent years been advanced by 
newfound attention to “altering rules,” that is, the rules that govern not whether, but how a 
rule can be altered, and how altering rules can be most desirably designed. See generally, 
Ian Ayers, Regulating Opt-Out, 121 YALE L. J. 2032 (2012) (emphasizing the emerging 
scholarly and policymaking focus on “altering rules,” the rules that regulate how to deviate 
from default rules); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in 
Corporate Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 383 (2007) (examining altering rules in the corporate 
context, but not addressing issue of corporate purpose). I situate my inquiry about private 
ordering of corporate purpose within that bourgeoning literature. 
12
 Prior even to using a “business organization,” nothing would stop a person from running 
a sole proprietorship in a manner that balanced numerous aims, say, profitability and 
environmental stewardship.  Entrepreneurs, however, want to do business through a legal 




embraces maximum mutability, stating:  “It is the policy of this chapter to 
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”13  This maximum 
freedom provision is not found in Delaware’s General Corporation Law, or 
in the new PBC statute.
14 
 Because of the “maximum flexibility” of the LLC 
statute, it is appropriate, in a sense, to conceive of the Limited Liability 
Company as the foundational business entity, with the more restrictive 
corporate form (it is undoubtedly more restrictive in some ways)
15
 
construed as a sub-species of the LLC, one that provides specific terms that 
many investors find desirable.
16
   
                                                                                                                            
entity in order to exploit advantages that legal forms provide, including most importantly, 
limited liability to the entrepreneur for the debts of the business (in both contract and tort), 
and affirmative asset segregation, insulating the assets of the business from the reach of an 
owner’s personal creditors.  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role 
of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L. REV. 387 (2000).  See also generally Ann E. 
Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Socially-Driven 
Purposes, 38 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 780 (2012) (“The Delaware LLC offers 
contractual freedom to investors, managers, owners, funds, and foundations to structure a 
for-benefit, for-profit socially responsible business plan with limited liability for owners 
and investors . . . due to its completely mobile, contractual character.”). 
13
 8 DEL. C. § 18-1101.   
14
 The LLC statute further provides that “to the extent that . . . at law or in equity . . . [a] 
person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited liability company . . . [the] 
person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited 
liability company agreement.”  8 DEL. C. § 18-1101.  The LLC statute does state that LLC 
agreements “may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.”  Id.  The Delaware Court of Chancery has also held that on public policy grounds 
it will not enforce LLC provisions disclaiming liability for fraudulent misrepresentations 
where the representations are knowingly falsely made.  But these limitation must surely be 
trivial, in that vanishingly few business-people would seek to contract to such provision.  In 
CML, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1043 (Del. 2011) the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
the LLC statute limits derivative suits to “members” of the LLC, and that creditors did not 
therefore having standing to bring suit on the LLC’s behalf even where the LLC was 
insolvent, even though creditors of insolvent corporations do have standing to bring 
derivative suits.  See infra text accompanying notes __-__ .  The Court’s discussion in 
CML suggests that the standing limitation could not be muted by contract.  However, the 
LLC statute stipulates that the LLC agreement may designate “members” who have no 
equity interest in the LLC.   
15
 See infra text accompanying notes __-__. 
16
 For example, if a promoter wanted to form a business that was governed by all aspects of 
Delaware corporate law except that she wanted to opt-out of duty of loyalty liability for 
LLC managers, as is permitted under the LLC statute but forbidden under the Delaware 
corporate code, then the promoter could form an LLC with an operating agreement stating 
that the LLC would be governed by the standards set forth in the Delaware corporate code 
and case law interpreting it, except for the corporate code’s prohibition on eliminating duty 




  The freedom available in the LLC form makes inquiry into the 
mutability of shareholder primacy in corporate governance a trivial pursuit, 
in a technical sense.
 17
   But only in a technical sense.  Mutability within the 
Delaware General Corporation Law matters a great deal as a matter of 
custom, culture, and practice.  Investors prefer the stability and reliability of 
the Delaware corporation, as compared to the still relatively new LLC.
18
  
Many small firms start out as LLC’s, but before they can attract backing 
from venture capital, and almost certainly before they go public, lawyers 
and business people will usually insist on re-forming as a corporation.  And 
more often than not, they will insist on a Delaware corporation.  The 
question we are pursuing, therefore, is whether deviation from shareholder 
                                                                                                                            
of loyalty liability.  Cf. Bob Dylan, Highway 61 Revisited, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED 
(Columbia Records 1965) (“He found a promoter who nearly fell off the floor / He said, ‘I 
never engaged in this kind of thing before / But yes I think it can be very easily done.’”).   
17
 This was understood but not emphasized in the seminal debates twenty-five years ago on 
the “triviality” of corporate law, perhaps because the LLC was only just emerging at that 
time as an important form of business organization.  The LLC was invented in the 1977 in 
Wyoming, but its use was not widespread before the 1990’s.  See 17 WY. ST. § 15.  
Delaware did not adopt an LLC statute until 1991.  See 6 DEL. C. § 18. See Black, Is 
Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 557 (“We can imagine a continuum of avoidance 
costs, from the low cost extreme of opting out of a default rule, through the relatively low 
cost strategy of re-incorporating, the higher cost strategy of altering a company's capital 
structure, and at the high cost extreme, choosing a different form of enterprise organization.  
At some point, the cost of avoiding a rule is large enough so that we can’t call the rule 
trivial.”); see also Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties, supra note __ at 11 
(“[T]he parties to a firm can opt out of terms that are mandatory for all corporations simply 
by choosing among different investment and organizational forms. For example, the 
“mandatory” requirement of at least majority shareholder voting on significant corporate 
transactions can be avoided by disincorporating into a limited partnership. See also 
McDonnell, Sticky Defaults, supra note __  (arguing that it is best to conceive of corporate 
law rules along a continuum from easy to alter (what he calls “Teflon” rules) to very hard 
to alter, but that it is imprecise to think of rules as being ultimately mandatory; indeed, 
even if no form permits what you want to do you can always petition the government for a 
change).   
18
 See e.g., William J. Carney, et. al., Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 123, 125 (2012) (“Even if other states’ laws are 
superior, investors prefer incorporation in familiar Delaware.”); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward 
Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 121 (1999) (“By 
many accounts, Delaware’s prominence is rooted in its ability to provide a corporate 
environment that investors most prefer. Managers who choose Delaware are rewarded by 
investors; those who choose less investor-friendly states are punished.”). Cf. Black, Is 
Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 545. (“[S]ince 1966, Pennsylvania has allowed 
companies to adopt by charter any corporate governance provision whatsoever, whether or 
not contrary to Pennsylvania law”)(citing 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1306(a)8(ii)).  Yet 
Pennsylvania is home to few non-domestic corporations. 




primacy in corporate governance can be established within the friendly, 
familiar confines of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 
Private Ordering in the Delaware General Corporation Law  
The academic literature contains many scattered, undeveloped assertions 
that shareholder primacy is merely a default rule of corporate governance 
that can be muted by private ordering.  In their landmark study, The 
Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel 
Fischel took the mutability of shareholder primacy as a given: 
 
[W]hat is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for whom? 
Social welfare more broadly defined? . . . Our response to such 
questions is: who cares?  If the New York Times is formed to 
publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should 
be allowed to object. Those who came in at the beginning 
consented, and those who came later bought stock the price of 
which reflected the corporation’s tempered commitment to a profit 
objective. . . . Corporate ventures may select their preferred 
“constituencies.” The role of corporate law here, as elsewhere, is 




A more recent article by Jonathan Macey makes the same assumption, 
practically as an aside: “because the corporation is a contract-based form of 
business organization, maximizing shareholder gain is only a default rule.  
Shareholders could opt out of this goal if they so desired.”20  Later in the 
same article, Macey states: “These are the default rules in corporate law 
[i.e., shareholder primacy], subject to modification by the various 
participants in the corporate enterprise, of course.”21  Scholars typically 
give no citation for these kinds of statements, they are instead derivations, 
or postulates really, of the view that the corporation is a “nexus-of-
contracts,” and corporate law merely a standard form contract that parties 
can take or tailor as they like. 
The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance, 
developed in the late-1980s and early-1990s, ducked the question of muting 
corporate beneficiary, averring that the Principles “do[] not address the 
                                                 
19
 Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 
35-36 (1991). 
20
 Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 177, 179 (2008). 
21
 Macey, supra note __ at 189 (emphasis added). 




question, under what circumstances may a corporation that is organized 
under a business corporation law restrict the general profit-making objective 
. . . by a certificate provision.”22  A Comment in the Principles hedges: 
“[s]tatutory provisions governing the amendment of the certificate of 
incorporation are very open-ended on their face, but may nevertheless be 
subject to various express or implied restrictions.”23   However, the Chief 
Reporter of the Principles, Melvin Eisenberg, included a Reporter’s Note to 
the Comment, where he reflected that: “[b]ecause the [profitmaking] 
obligations . . . run to the shareholders, rather than to third parties or the 
state, there is little doubt that such limitations [on profitmaking] would 
normally be permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders.”24  Eisenberg’s 
Note, like the Principles themselves, operate at too general a level to 
provide precise guidance on the question of mutability in Delaware, or 
anywhere else.  It is impossible to answer hard corporate law questions 
without answering them about a specific body of corporate law, rather than 
“corporate law” generally.  
 
The Delaware General Corporation Law contains many clearly 
mandatory elements, as well as many explicitly mutable ones.  For example, 
firms are free to set the term of years that directors serve upon election to 
the board, but the term may not be set at more than three years.
25
 The 
charter may exculpate directors from liability for violations of the duty of 
care, but not the duty of loyalty.
26
  Delaware’s statute is usually clear about 
which of its explicit provisions are mandatory, and which are mutable.  
Where adumbrating mandatory provisions, the statute uses phrases like 
“every corporation shall,” and when describing default provisions it states 
                                                 
22
 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01.   
23
 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §2.01, Comment D.  
24
 Eisenberg was a central figure in the “triviality” debates of the late-1980s and 1990s.  
See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note __.  Ann Conaway appears to 
argue that a corporation could create, through language in the charter, “contractual,” but 
not “fiduciary” duties running to non-shareholders, since to her the corporation is a contract 
between the state, the stockholders, and the corporation.  See Anne E. Conaway, Lessons to 
Be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contract in Delaware’s Alternative Entity Law 
Might Inform Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789,793-794 & n. 
15 (2008).  But that begs the crucial questions:  first, why isn’t the corporate contract a 
contract among all of the firm’s stakeholders, and, second, can the contract that Conaway 
envisions permissibly be undertaken for purposes other than advancing shareholder 
interests?  These are the questions that I am trying to answer in this Article.  
25
 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §141(d). 
26
 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §102(b)(7).  See also infra text accompanying notes __-__ 
(discussing the genesis of this exculpation provision).    




“unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation.”27 However, 
strange as it may (rightly) seem to those unfamiliar with this area of law, the 
issue of corporate beneficiary is not directly addressed in Delaware’s 
corporate law statute.
28
  The black letter law on this crucial matter has 
instead been supplied by case law, clearly specifies that shareholder 
primacy is (at least) the default rule under Delaware law.
29
  Non-
shareholder interests can be taken into account, but only when doing so is 
“rationally related” to serving the shareholders.30   
 
This rule of shareholder primacy is stated in a number of Delaware 
cases, the most recent and explicit of which is eBay v. Newmark.
31
  A 
founder of Craigslist, Inc., the popular online “classifieds” website, sold his 
stake in the company to eBay, Inc.  Later, eBay complained that the 
remaining founders were pursuing designs to entrench themselves in control 
of Craigslist, in order to ensure that the company would continue to operate 
as a kind of community service, and not be forced to focus only on 
shareholders.  The founders frankly acknowledged this motive.  Chancellor 
William Chandler made clear that such a motive was impermissible:  
Jim and Craig opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit 
Delaware corporation . . . . Having chosen a for-profit corporate 
                                                 
27
 See Gordon, supra note __ at 1553 & n. 16 (“[T]he phrase ‘unless otherwise provided in 
the certificate of incorporation,’ runs through the famously flexible Delaware code like a 
leitmotif.  Nevertheless, many features of corporate law, great and small, are mandatory.”). 
28
 Compare the situation in Delaware to that in California, where the statute is clear: “A 
director shall perform the duties of a director . . . in good faith, in a manner such director 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”  CALIFORNIA 
CORPORATIONS CODE § 309(a).     
29
 See generally Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note __.  The urgency of 
the question of mutability of corporate purpose only emerges after one understands that 
shareholder primacy is in fact the prevailing law. If one assumes that directors presently 
have latitude with respect to whether or not to put shareholder interests first, then the 
question of muting away from shareholder primacy is moot.  See Lyman Johnson, 
Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 
269, 271-72 (2013) (criticizing proponents of benefit corporations for “misunderstanding 
that traditional for-profit corporations (like LLCs) are legally free to pursue social or 
environmental goals and except in limited circumstances in Delaware most notably, are not 
required to maximize corporate profits and/or shareholder wealth.”).     
30
 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985) 
(“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, 
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”).  
31
 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).  The cases 
that speak directly to the issue of corporate beneficiary all pre-date the creation of the 
Delaware Public Benefit Corporation, and so we do not have any teaching about the 
relationship between the two statutes.   




form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and 
standards that accompany that form. Those standards include 
acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean at 
least that. Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of 
implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically, 
clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value 




In eBay, Chancellor Chandler thus made clear both that shareholder 
primacy is the law and  that corporate “persona,” public statements, routine 
self-descriptions, and board policies were not sufficient to alter the default 
rule of shareholder primacy.
33
 However, neither eBay, nor other cases 
expressing Delaware’s shareholder primacy norm, however, makes clear 
whether the rule is mandatory or alterable, and if alterable, how to alter it.
34
   
While the Delaware statute does not supply the shareholder primacy 
norm, it does provide multiple open-ended invitations to private-ordering.  
The broadest opportunity comes in Section 102, which describes necessary 
and permissive elements of the “certificate of incorporation.”  Section 
102(a)(3) says the certificate “shall set forth … [t]he nature of the business 
or purposes to be conducted or promoted.”35  It continues: “[it] shall be 
                                                 
32
 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).    
33
 It should be clear, therefore, that it will not be sufficient for a corporation operating 
under the default rules in Delaware to point to corporate persona, marketing materials, or 
statements from the board to establish that the corporation has, say, a sincerely held 
religious belief that would excuse it from complying with laws of general application under 
RFRA, unless the directors can also claim in good faith that they believed adherence to 
religious beliefs was the surest path to profits for the shareholders.  See supra text 
accompanying notes __-__ (discussing Hobby Lobby).  Even if the Supreme Court were 
willing to credit non-charter statements for purposes of extending RFRA’s protections, if 
such statements confessed a commitment to sacrifice profits in service of religious 
believes, then the directors would have to answer for it in Delaware.   
34
 Ian Ayers argues that when discussing legal rules judges should specify whether they 
consider the rules to be mandatory or mutable.  It they conclude in a case before them that 
the parties have not effectively altered a mutable rule, the judge should specify how the 
parties might have done it.  This would give guidance to future parties, and it would also 
force the hand of the legislature if it desires some mode of alteration other than that 
suggested by judicial dicta.  See Ayers, Regulating Opt-Out, supra note __ at 2055-2059.  
Cf. David A. Wishnick, Corporate Purposes in a Free Enterprise System: A Comment on 
eBay v. Newark, 121 Yale L. J. 2405, 2410-2411 (2012) (incorrectly interpreting 
Chancellor Chandler’s verbiage in eBay as expressing the view that shareholder primacy in 
corporate governance is immutable). 
35
 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(a)(3). 




sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the 
purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for 
which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law 
of Delaware.”36  Here would seem to be the place where promoters could 
specify that their firm will be governed by a multi-stakeholder governance 
regime, rather than the default rule of shareholder primacy.  But this begs 
the question: is multiple-stakeholder governance a “lawful act or activity for 
which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law 
of Delaware” or not?  I will return to that question below.37  
Interpretation of the scope of private ordering available under section 
102(a)(3) is complicated and confused by the section’s history, and the 
general history of corporate law statutes.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, states granted corporate charters only by specific legislative 
action, for particular undertakings or “purposes,” such as the organization 
of a railroad, or the building of a canal.  In the early twentieth century, 
states adopted “general” incorporation statutes, which made corporate 
charters available by routine administrative action to all comers.  The 
general incorporation statutes still required corporate promoters to specify 
the purpose or type of business their corporation would undertake.  In this 
stage of the evolution of corporate law, however, the stipulation of 
“purpose” in the charter became less a limitation on corporate power 
imposed by a jealous state, and more a protection afforded to corporate 
investors, who were thought to be entitled to some certainty about the kind 
of business they were investing in.  Corporate acts that went beyond the 
corporate purpose specified in the charter were “ultra vires,” void (or later, 
voidable), and could be enjoined by shareholders or the government.  Soon 
enough it became evident, however, that what investors really wanted was 
for their firms to enter whatever fields of endeavor might prove profitable.  
Promoters therefore started stuffing long lists of permissible purposes into 
corporate charters, which could reach cumbersome and absurd lengths.  
Solicitous legislatures responded by reforming general incorporation 
statutes to allow firms to specify that their purpose was to undertake “any 
lawful act or activity.”38   
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 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(a)(3). 
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 See infra text accompanying notes __-__. 
38
 See David G. Yosifon, Corporate Aid of Governmental Authority: History and Analysis 
of an Obscure Power in Delaware Corporate Law, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1086 (2013) 
(distinguishing between corporate purposes, corporate powers, and corporate 
beneficiaries). 




Most Delaware business corporations are today in fact formed with the 
catch-all purpose of engaging in “any lawful act or activity.”  But this is 
never taken to establish a deviation from the shareholder primacy norm, or 
to express an expansion of the default beneficiary to include, say, any 
beneficiary that could be lawfully served by a corporation.  Rather, the 
provision is supplied in order to give directors the greatest possible 
discretion in selecting means to serve the default beneficiary.  Indeed, 
Craigslist’s certificate of incorporation stated that its purpose was to 
“engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be 
organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware.”39  Yet this 
expansive language played no role whatsoever in Chancellor Chandler’s 
disquisition on the law of corporate purpose in the eBay case.   
Still, it seems plausible to conjecture that section 102(a)’s invitation to 
state the corporation’s “purpose” could be used to specify a change in 
beneficiary, which by default is the shareholders.
40
  While it would require 
a somewhat twisted construction of the statutory language, we could 
understand (or encourage courts to understand) the broad “any lawful act” 
language to incorporate the default beneficiary of corporate operations – the 
shareholders – and to express that the firm may do any business in service 
of that end.  However, explicit specification of a purpose to serve multiple-
stakeholders, or to otherwise deviate from the shareholder primacy default 
could be achieved by stipulation through section 102(a) making that clear.  
And then, of course, the charter could further specify that “any lawful act” 
(any kind of business activity) may be undertaken to serve that privately 
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 Certificate of Incorporation of Craigslist, Inc., October 13, 2004.  On file with author.  
40
 See infra text accompanying notes __-__ (discussing the use of the “purpose” provision 
in Delaware non-profit corporations). 
41
 Many different approaches to private ordering of corporate beneficiary could be 
imagined.  For example, a charter might call upon directors to “balance” the interests of 
multiple-stakeholders, including shareholders, workers, and consumers.  The charter might 
also specify how the duties it establishes are to be enforced. The default rule in Delaware is 
that only shareholders have standing to bring derivative claims while the firm is solvent, 
and the creditors have standing to bring such claims where the firm is insolvent. See 
Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin (2014), 102 A.3d 155 (2014) (Laster, 
Vice Chancellor).  If a charter explicitly indicated that the parties considered workers or 
consumers to be owed fiduciary duties, then the courts might be willing to recognize 
consumers as having standing. 




Drawing Insight From Non-Profit Corporate Law   
Many states have separate “for profit” and “non-profit” corporation 
statutes.  Delaware does not.  Both “for profit” and “non-profit” 
corporations are formed under the Delaware General Corporation Law.  The 
way that a Delaware non-profit is formed is instructive on the question of 
whether the shareholder primacy norm in Delaware corporate law is subject 
to private ordering.   
 
The statute does not directly specify how a “non-profit” corporation is 
created.  Section 102(a)(4) contemplates the formation of corporations that 
are not authorized to issue stock, and that section states that a non-stock 
corporation “shall” state the “non-stock” limitation in its charter, and 
“shall” state the “conditions of membership of the corporation,” in their 
charter.
42
  Crucially however, for present purposes, there is no requirement 
that “non-stock” corporations be “non-profit” corporations, and for-profit 
non-stock corporations are apparently routinely created as special purpose 
vehicles in complex business settings.
43
  Therefore, something more than 
status as a “non-stock” corporation is required to make a firm a non-profit 
corporation in Delaware.  There is no “for-profit”/“non-profit” binary 
evident or implied in the architecture of the Delaware code.
44
     
 
As if in response to the lack of clarity in the statute on how to form a 
non-profit corporation, the Delaware Division of Corporations maintains a 
form on its website for those who wish to form non-profit, exempt 
organizations.
45
  The form prompts the user to add the verbiage “[t]his 
Corporation shall be a nonprofit corporation” in the purpose section of the 
charter, and it instructs the user to place that language after the phrase, 
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 The charter may specify that membership conditions are to be provided in the 
corporation’s bylaws.  See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §102(a)(4) 
43
 A series of 2010 amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law did provide 
some clarification on the application of the statute to non-stock corporations.  But the 2010 
amendments have no guidance to offer with respect to the issues under review here.  See 
John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Black Rohrbacher, New Day for  Nonstock Corporations: The 
2010 Amendments to Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 66 BUSINESS LAWYER 271 
(2010). 
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 When it comes to establishing the fees that corporations must pay for their Delaware 
chartering privileges, the General Corporation Law does squarely distinguish between for-
profit and non-profit corporations.  Section 391(j), for example, provides special corporate 
franchise tax treatment for “exempt” organizations, and it essentially uses federal standards 
for establishing tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. 501(c), to determine whether firms are 
“exempt” for the purpose of state franchise taxes.   See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 391(j). 
45
 On file with author, available at https://corp.delaware.gov/Inc_Exempt.pdf 




“[t]he purpose of the  corporation is to engage in any lawful act of [sic] 
activity for which corporations may be organized under the General 
Corporation Law of Delaware.”46  This procedure is not established by 
statute, but it roughly tracks what I have suggested is the path to any kind of 
private-ordering of corporate beneficiary under the Delaware statute.   
The fiduciary law applicable to Delaware non-profits is underdeveloped, 
both in case law and in scholarship.
47
  But the Delaware Supreme Court has 
had no difficulty locating the other-than-profit-maximizing goals of 
charitable corporations with reference to the private ordering specified in 
the charter.  In a prominent (for other reasons) case called Oberly v. Kirby,
48
 
the Delaware Supreme Court stated:  
because the Foundation was created for a limited charitable 
purpose rather than a generalized business purpose, those who 
control it have a special duty to advance its charitable goals and 
protect its assets. Any action that poses a palpable and identifiable 
threat to those goals, or that jeopardizes its assets would be 
contrary to the Certificate and hence ultra vires.
49
  
More recently, Vice-Chancellor Glasscock had occasion to expound on the 
fiduciary duties of the directors of non-profit corporations.  In Gassis v. 
Corkery, he wrote: “[Oberly] made clear that a nonprofit charitable 
corporation’s board owes fiduciary duties to its beneficiaries, not to its 
members qua members or directors qua directors.”50  He concluded: 
“nothing in the record indicates that the charitable interests of the 
Defendants [i.e., decisions made by the board] are incompatible with the 
aims of the Fund as stated in its Certificate of Incorporation.”51 
This states it clearly.  The goals of the charity are established in the 
certificate, and those goals describe and limit the responsibilities of the 
board, which is not otherwise distinguishable, in essence, from an ordinary 
(default) board of a general business corporation.  The indubitable 
implication of the fact that non-profit corporations are subsumed within the 
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 See Mary A. Jacobson, Nonprofit Corporations: Conversion to For-Profit Corporate 
Status and Nonprofit Corporation Members Rights – Farahpour v. DCX., 20 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 635 (1995). 
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 Oberly v. Kirby, 492 A.2d 445 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1991).  
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 Oberly v. Kirby, 492 A.2d 445, 462 (Del. 1991) (first emphasis added). 
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 Gassis v. Corkery, No. CIV.A. 8868-VCG, 2014 WL 2200319, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 28, 
2014) aff'd, 113 A.3d 1080 (Del. 2015) 
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 Gassis v. Corkery, supra note __  at *15 (emphasis added). 




Delaware General Corporation Law is that the beneficiary of Delaware 
corporate governance is subject to private ordering. The legal architecture 
here makes two points about Delaware law clear: first, the default rule is 
profit-maximization, and second, promoters can deviate from that default if 
they so desire. 
Consistency with the Laws of Delaware 
The search for permissible private-ordering of corporate beneficiary 
may fruitfully be continued in section 102(b) of the Delaware corporate 
code, which states that in addition to required information, the certificate 
“may also contain . . . [a]ny provision for the management of the business 
and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation . . . if such provisions 
are not contrary to the laws of this State.”52  This nod to private-ordering 
may be as good a place to express deviation from the shareholder primacy 
norm as is section 102(a), but its import is again obscured by the question-
begging language: “if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this 
State.”53  This limitation echoes section 102(a)’s invitation to place in the 
charter any purpose “for which a corporation may be organized under the 
laws of Delaware,”54 and the two restrictions may properly be read as co-
extensive for present purposes.  We must ask whether a governance 
provision under section 102(b) altering the shareholder primacy norm in 
corporate governance, a rule established not by statute but by common law, 
would be “contrary to the laws” of Delaware.  
In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel, decided in 1952, the Delaware Supreme 
Court concluded that “the laws of this State” referenced in the cognate rule 
of the then-existing Delaware corporate code, sometimes, but not always, 
includes the common law.
55
  Sterling concerned a merger between the 
Hilton Corporation and the Mayflower Hotel.   Prior to the merger, Hilton 
owned a controlling stake in Mayflower, and Hilton’s representatives 
dominated Mayflower’s board.  Some minority Mayflower shareholders 
objected to the merger and asserted that the Mayflower board’s approval of 
the deal was invalid, because the board had counted interested Hilton-
representatives on the Mayflower board towards establishing a quorum, in 
violation of Delaware case law, which stated that interested directors could 
not be counted towards a quorum for votes involving interested 
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  Mayflower’s certificate of incorporation contained a 
provision specifying that interested directors could count towards a quorum, 
but the plaintiff shareholders argued that this charter provision was invalid, 
since it was “contrary to the laws” of Delaware, as expressed in the 
common law.   
The Sterling Court rejected the idea that corporations are precluded 
from modifying “any rule of the common law relating to the regulation of 
the corporate enterprise,” because “[s]uch a construction unwarrantably 
narrows the scope of the enabling portion of the paragraph.”57  The Court 
allowed the charter provision counting interested directors towards a 
quorum to stand.  Before doing so, however, the Court instructed that the 
common law sometimes will count as “law” that charter provisions cannot 
contravene:   
[It] it is clear that the scope of the proviso is broader than the field 
of statutory law. . . .We do not attempt a definition; but we say that 
the stockholders of a Delaware corporation may by contract 
embody in the charter a provision departing from the rules of the 
common law, provided that it does not transgress a statutory 
enactment or a public policy settled by the common law or 
implicit in the General Corporation Law itself.
58
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 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117 (1952). 
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 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117 (1952) (emphasis added). 
58
 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 313-14, 93 A.2d 107, 118 (1952) 
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In 1967 the Delaware legislature amended Section 144 to specify that “[c]ommon or 
interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting 
of the board of directors or of a committee which authorizes the contract or transaction.” 
This essentially flipped the default rule.   The verbiage in §144(b) is somewhat weird, why 
does it say that interested directors “may” be counted towards a quorum.  What does it 
depend on?  Since Section 144(b) does not state “unless otherwise provided in the articles 
of incorporation,” we now have to ask whether it is permissible for firms to specify in their 
articles that interested directors may not count towards a quorum.  Ernest Folk, III, who 




It seems to me that nothing is no public policy clearly indicated in the 
common law establishing shareholder primacy as the corporate governance 
norm that would suggest that it should be unalterable by charter provision.
59
  
Neither does there seem to be a clearly implied policy of the General 
Corporation Law to prohibit alteration of the shareholder primacy norm in 
firm governance, at least not until recently.  However, the Public Benefit 
Corporation statute is literally a part of the General Corporation Law: it is 
organized as Subchapter 15 of Title 7, which in the Delaware Code is the 
General Corporation Law.
60
  It might be argued that the presence of the 
public benefit corporation form within the corporate code implies that the 
policy of the General Corporation Law is to offer the Public Benefit 
Corporation, rather than open-ended private ordering, as the sole alternative 
to shareholder primacy in corporate governance.
61
   
Let us turn now to consideration of the Public Benefit Corporation and 
its relationship to the overarching General Corporation Law.   
III. PRIVATE-ORDERING AND PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATIONS  
 
The Public Benefit Corporation Statute 
In 2013, in response to activist pressure and a wave of similar 
legislation in other states, Delaware amended its corporate law to provide 
for the creation of Public Benefit Corporations.  According to the Delaware 
                                                                                                                            
was the principle architect of Delaware’s sweeping 1967 reforms, wrote in his 1972 treatise 
reflecting on and interpreting those reforms:  “The effect of §144(b) is to adopt as a rule of 
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COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 89 (1972) (emphasis added).  Perhaps the “may” in the 
statutory formulation invites that interpretation. 
59
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to serve the shareholders. 
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 See infra, text accompanying notes __-__.      




statute, “A ‘public benefit corporation’ is a for-profit corporation . . . that is 
intended to produce a public benefit . . . and to operate in a responsible and 
sustainable manner.”62 
 
The first section of the statute specifies that Public Benefit Corporations 
are “subject in all respects” to the General Corporation Law, “except to the 
extent this subchapter imposes additional or different requirements, in 
which case such requirements shall apply.”63  And impose additional or 
different requirements it does, in heaps.  The PBC statute is strict and 
allows very little private ordering.  It contains many “shalls,” just a few 
“mays,” and the phrase “unless otherwise specified in the certificate of 
incorporation” is absent altogether.   
Now, of particular importance to this inquiry is the final section of the 
PBC statute, section 368, which is captioned “No effect on other 
corporations.”64 It states:  “This subchapter shall not affect a statute or rule 
of law that is applicable to a corporation that is not a public benefit 
corporation except as provided in § 363 of this title [which relates to 
amendments to charters of existing firms].”65  So, facially this should mean 
that if opting-out of shareholder primacy through private-ordering was 
permitted prior to the PBC being passed, then that “rule  of law” should be 
unaffected by the PBC’s adoption. It is just that a privately-ordered multi-
stakeholder firm cannot call itself a Public Benefit Corporation, because in 
order to be a PBC you must comply with the PBC statute.   Or, is a firm that 
attempts to deviate from shareholder primacy in its own way now 
condemned as an improperly-formed Public Benefit Corporation?
66
  We 
must examine the extent to which section 368’s “no impact” assertion can 
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 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 361 (emphasis added). 
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 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L.§ 368. 
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indeed hold back an effort to view what is possible in the General 
Corporation Law though the lens of what have been created with the Public 
Benefit Corporation.   
Consider first some of the mandatory terms of the public benefit 
corporation.  Section 362 of the statute specifies that “in the certificate of 
incorporation, a public benefit corporation shall (i) Identify within its 
statement of business or purpose pursuant to section 102(a)(3) of this title 
one or more specific public benefits to be promoted by the corporation, and 
(ii) state within its heading that it is a public benefit corporation.”67  This 
helps vindicate the view, expressed above, that section 102(a)(3) is the 
place to pursue multi-stakeholder governance). Section 362(b) defines 
“public benefit”: 
‘Public benefit’ means a positive effect (or reduction of negative 
effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities 
or interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as 
stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an artistic, 
charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, 
literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological nature.
68
  
The PBC includes several mandatory notice requirements.  Section 
362(c) requires that notice of the PBC status of the corporation be given to 
anyone to whom shares in the firm are issued.
69
  Public Benefit 
Corporations do not have to use the phrase “public benefit corporation” or 
the abbreviation “PBC” in their corporate name, but if they do, then such 
usage is sufficient to provide the notice.
70
  Additionally, Section 364 
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requires the stock certificates of PBC’s to “note conspicuously that the 
corporation is a public benefit corporation.”71 
The statute also includes mandatory reporting requirements that, while 
not draconian, might be undesirable for some firm promoters (because they 
are costly).  A PBC: “shall no less than biennially provide its stockholders 
with a statement as to the corporation’s promotion of the . . . public benefits 
identified in the certificate of incorporation and of the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation's conduct.”72  The section includes 
several additional “shalls” concerning what this reporting statement must 
contain.
73
   
 
Section 366(c) provides some expressly mutable elements, which are 
not hugely important on their own (the charter may require the public 
benefit report to be issued more frequently than biennially, it may require 
that the report be made available to the public) but their very presence 
serves to highlight the immutability of the rest of the benefit corporation 
provisions.   
Section 368’s promise that the public benefit corporation statute has “no 
effect on other corporations” notwithstanding, is it now plausible to think 
that a privately ordered multi-stakeholder corporation that does give actual 
notice of its deviation from shareholder primacy, or note its deviant status 
on its stock certificates, would be permissible?  After all, there is no general 
requirement that notice be given for charter-based departures from standard 
default terms, for example for the adoption of staggered boards, imposition 
of super-majorities for board elections and amendment adoptions, etc.  It is 
quite possible that Chancery would now say that the implied public policy 
of the Delaware General Corporation Law is that deviation from 
shareholder primacy has to be in the way prescribed by the PBC sections of 
the statute.  The notice requirement is not onerous or particularly restrictive 
to what private-orderers might want to do, but other features of the PBC are 
quite restrictive indeed. 
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For example, governance of the public benefit corporation is also 
strictly prescribed by the PBC statute: 
 
The board of directors shall manage . . . the business and affairs of 
the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the 
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific 





This is a highly specific, rigid form of multi-stakeholder governance.  
Again, no “unless otherwise provided in the articles” is offered.  The 
question we must ask (are asking) is whether this specificity is trivial, in the 
sense that it can be avoided by private-ordering, or non-trivial in the sense 
that it is the only way to deviate from shareholder primacy under Delaware 
corporate law.
75
  One can easily imagine desirable alternatives, such as a 
governance design that instructs the board to “pursue profits first and 
foremost, but in a way that is not unduly disruptive of the legitimate 
interests of nonshareholders.” Or, “pursue profits in a way that privileges 
environmental sustainability over short-term profitmaking.”  But the PBC 
calls for only one model: directors are to “balance” shareholder interests 
with the public benefits identified in the certificate.  One scholar has 
suggested that “balance” may be  construed to mean giving equal weight to 
each factor
 
(otherwise, the thing would be unbalanced).
76
  Even if it were 
not given such a literal meaning, this is still a specific and rigid governance 
charge.   
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 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 365(a)(emphasis added). 
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 Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 54 (arguing that mandatory rules are 
“trivial” if they are “market mimicking, avoidable, changeable, or unimportant.”).     
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 See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note __ at 355 n. 64.  Murray notes that 
the Model Public Benefit Corporation Legislation crafted and promoted by the non-profit 
group B Lab requires directors to “consider” both the shareholder and public benefit 
interests described in the PBC charter, rather than “balance” them, as the Delaware public 
benefit corporation statute prescribes.  See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301, available 
at http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation). Murray reports that his telephone 
conversations with members of the Delaware Corporation Committee that drafted that 
state’s PBC legislation reveal different views among committee members as to what 
“balance” means, and whether it is a more or less demanding standard than “consider.” Id.  
This suggests either that the language in the statute was not carefully crafted, or else that it 
was carefully crafted to be ambiguous.  In any event, the legislative history of the provision 
will not provide much guidance to a court confronted with construing it.  See supra note __ 
and accompanying text (noting sparse legislative history bearing on the Delaware PBC).   




The statute also insists that the governance principles of a public benefit 
corporation can only be meekly enforced.  Section 365(b) states that a PBC 
director: 
shall not, by virtue of the public benefit provisions [in the charter] 
. . . have any duty to any person on account of any interest of such 
person in the public benefit or public benefits identified in the 
certificate of incorporation . . . and, with respect to a decision 
implicating the balance requirement in subsection (a) of this 
section, will be deemed to satisfy such director’s fiduciary duties 
to stockholders and the corporation if such director’s decision is 
both informed and disinterested and not such that no person of 
ordinary, sound judgment would approve.
77
 
Non-shareholders have no duty owed to them and have no power to enforce 
the charter’s “benefit” provisions.  Only shareholders can enforce the 
directors obligation to pursue the non-pecuniary benefit described in the 
charter.
78
  It is therefore best to conceive of PBCs as “socially conscious 
shareholder primacy” firms, rather than firms with multiple genuine 
beneficiaries.  PBC’s are still concerned only with the shareholder interest, 
they simply conceive of the shareholder interest more expansively than the 
pecuniary regard.  But some people – investors, workers, consumers – 
might desire to associate with a firm that allowed non-shareholders to 
enforce real duties that were really owed to them.    Could a firm achieve 
                                                 
77
 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §365(b) (emphasis added).  Section 362(c) provides an 
“exculpation” provision that is broader than that which is available under the General 
Corporation Law.  It states that the charter, “may include a provision that any disinterested 
failure to satisfy this section shall not, for the purposes of § 102(b)(7) or § 145 of this title, 
constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.”  8 Del. 
Gen. Corp. L. §  365.  The language appears to allow opting out of liability for failures of 
“oversight,” which the Delaware Supreme Court has said is a species of good faith, which 
is a species of loyalty.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)  (“Where directors 
fail to act in the face of a known duty to act . . . they breach their duty of loyalty by failing 
to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.”).  Opting-out of liability for 
disinterested bad faith failure of oversight is not permitted under the General Corporation 
Law. 
78
 The PBC statute imposes substantially more onerous derivative standing requirements 
for shareholders than those that govern derivative suits in ordinary corporations.  
Shareholders of public benefit corporations can only sue derivatively if they own 
“individually or collectively . . . at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, in 
the case of a corporation with shares listed on a national securities exchange, the lesser of 
such percentage or shares of at least $2,000,000 in market value.”  8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 
367.  The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation calls for only shareholders to have default 
standing to bring derivative actions by default, but allows firms to specify in the charter 
that other stakeholders also have standing.  See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305(c)(iv). 




such a design by forming a non-PBC firm with a charter provision 
specifying that directors have an enforceable obligation to the non-
shareholding interest specified in the charter?  If such private-altering is 
possible, then the Public Benefit Corporation was unnecessary.  If the 
Public Benefit Corporation was necessary to achieve any deviation from 
shareholder primacy, or is now the only allowable alternative form, then 
such private ordering is not possible. 
Policymakers and commentators have described the Public Benefit 
Corporation as adding flexibility to corporate law design.
79
  But it may 
actually have reduced flexibility, making it more difficult to form socially 
conscious enterprises, and restricting the ability of existing shareholder 
primacy firms to adopt charter amendments committing themselves to 
greater social responsibility.  This may not have been the intent, but it may 
end up being the result.    
Statutory Interpretation 
The crux of the interpretive problem here is whether the public benefit 
corporation created merely a “menu option,” providing a specific type of 
non-shareholder primacy governance corporation, or whether it is the first 
and only type of non-shareholder governance that is permissible under the 
Delaware General Corporation law.  Where legislatures introduce “menu 
options” to make salient that something is permissible under a statutory 
scheme, they risk inviting an understanding that the menu-option was not 
available until the legislature offered it, and risk a construction holding that 
the menu option is the only thing of its sort that is permissible.  By their 
explicit authorization of some act, the law that predates the promulgation of 
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See William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, White Paper: The Need and Rationale for the 
Benefit Corporation: Why It is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Needs of Social 
Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public (Version of January 18, 2013) 
(hereinafter, “White Paper) at 1 (“The benefit corporation is the most comprehensive yet 
flexible legal entity devised to address the needs of entrepreneurs and investors and, 
ultimately, the general public.”).  See also William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, 
How Benefit Corporations are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 817 (2012) (formal publication of the White Paper).  Certainly the public 
statements by the Governor and others emphasized adding flexibility. At a press event 
announcing the legislation, Delaware Governor Jack Markell said, “We’ve all heard about 
corporations wanting to ‘do well’ while also ‘doing good.’  With this new law, Delaware 
corporations will now have the ability to build those dual purposes into their governing 
documents.”  See “Governor Markell Signs Public Benefit Corporation Legislation,” July 
17, 2013, available at http://news.delaware.gov/2013/07/17/governor-markell-signs-public-
benefit-corporation-legislation/ (quoting Markell).  




the menu option may subsequently be interpreted (or misinterpreted) as 
having forbid the newly menu-ed option.
80
   
 
Consider the introduction of the exculpation “menu option” of section 
102(b)(7) into the Delaware corporate code in 1988.
81
  This section states 
that the certificate “may” contain “a provision eliminating or limiting the 
personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for 
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director.”82  
Contemporary commentators tend to write and speak as if section 102(b)(7) 
gave corporations the power to do something that was previously forbidden.  
But that is far from clear.  At the time it was passed, many scholars opined 
that section 102(b)(7) was not necessary, because the power to exculpate 
directors by charter provision was already implicit in the statute.
83
  Indeed, 
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 See Michael Livingston, What’s Blue and White and Not Quite As Good As A Committee 
Report: General Explanations and the Role of “Subsequent” Tax Legislative History, 11 
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 91, 93-95 (1994) (“[E]vents taking place after enactment of a statute are 
relevant to its interpretation. . . . [T]he legislature's action (or inaction) on a later measure 
may suggest that it takes a particular view of existing law.  . . . [T]hese statements are not 
legislative history; but they may have a similar effect.”). 
81
 The statute was adopted in response to the shocking decision of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), holding the directors of Tran Union, Inc. liable for breach of the  
duty of care in connection with a profitable but rushed merger.  Van Gorkom is today read 
to have imposed a “process” obligation on directs before they can be given benefit of 
expansive judicial deference to the substantive decisions under the business judgment rule.   
82
 The provision insists that “such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a 
director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law.” 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §102(b)(7). 
83
 Norman Veasey, et. al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of 
Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 403 (1987) (“The 
concept of a provision in the certificate of incorporation limiting or eliminating the liability 
of directors was not without precedent. Some scholars had suggested that the certificate of 
incorporation of Delaware corporations could be amended to limit or eliminate liability of 
directors without enabling legislation . . . . Indeed, some corporations had already adopted 
such provisions.”).  In  1990, Butler and Ribstein wrote: 
There is a substantial debate among the Reporters for the A.L.I. project 
as to whether statutory authorization is necessary to validate opt-out 
provisions, with [John] Coffee supporting the section 7.17 approach of 
validating opt-outs even in the absence of a charter provision, and the 
Chief Reporter and Reporter for Part IV [Ribstein himself] insisting on 
legislative authority. 
Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties, supra note __ at 67.  In a footnote, they 
assert:  “The provision is valid only if it merely clarifies an amendment power that existed 
prior to enactment of the provision rather than enlarging the majority's power to amend the 
contract.” Id. at 67 n. 300.  See also PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 139—43 (Tent. Draft 
No. 9, 1989).  




while clearly not widespread, an example of jurists sanctioning an 
exculpation clause privately-ordered into a corporate charter can be traced 
to an English case from 1911
84
 charging a rubber plantation’s directors with 
a level of indifference in running the firm that would have made Mrs. 
Prichard.
85
  The charter of the firm, however, contained a provision stating 
that, “[n]o director . . . shall be liable . . . for any loss or damage occasioned 
by any error of judgment or oversight . . . unless the same happen through 
his own dishonesty.”86  The learned Judge Neville allowed it: “I do not 
think that it is illegal for a company to engage its directors upon such terms.  
I do not think, therefore, that an action by this company against its directors 
for negligence, where no dishonesty was alleged, could have succeeded.”87  
I have not found any cases in Delaware or elsewhere, where exculpation by 
charter provision was disallowed prior to the promulgation of section 
102(b)(7).   
 
However, years after section 102(b)(7) was adopted, it has become 
commonplace to read legal scholars writing as if the provision was an 
innovation that allowed something that had been previously forbidden, 
rather than as clarifying the existence of a power that was there all along.
88
 
This re-framing was soon found also in the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
own retrospective interpretation about what section 102(b)(7) did.  In 
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 In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Limited, 1 Ch. 425 (1911).   
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 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (holding a corporate 
director liable for corporate looting undertaken by her children because “they spawned 
their fraud in the backwater of her neglect”). 
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 In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Limited, 1 Ch. 425, 479-480. 
87
 In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Limited, 1 Ch. 425, 480. 
88
 For example, after noting that LLC’s are free to exculpate professional advisors from 
liability for aiding and abetting managerial breaches of fiduciary duty, Ann Conawy 
laments that “[u]nder the current corporate scheme of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law (DGCL), no such protection for advisors to a board of directors is available since 
section 102(b)(7) only permits the elimination of personal accountability of a director to 
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary liability for the fiduciary duty of care.”  
Conaway, Lessons to Be Learned, supra note __ at 792.  See also Marcel Kahan & Edward 
B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions As 
Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 522 (2003) (“Sometimes, a new law or doctrine is 
needed to clarify an ambiguity or to address a novel issue. At other times, the law may be 
modified to expand the available choices. The adoption of title 8, section 102(b)(7) . . . falls 
in the latter category.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate 
Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1639 (2005) (“[S]tockholders 
[can] reduce or eliminate director monetary liability for breaching the duty of due care. 
Most states do not extend this protection to officers. Delaware, for example, does not.
 
 
Companies thus cannot by charter limit this exposure.”)(citing §102(b)(7)). 




Gantler v. Stephens, the Court for the first time explicitly held that officers 
owe “identical” fiduciary duties to the shareholders, much as directors do.89  
Immediately after announcing this, the Court dropped a footnote: 
That does not mean, however, that the consequences of a fiduciary 
breach by directors or officers, respectively, would necessarily be 
the same. Under 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), a corporation may adopt a 
provision in its certificate of incorporation exculpating its directors 
from monetary liability for an adjudicated breach of their duty of 
care. Although legislatively possible, there currently is no 





When section 102(b)(7) was passed there was at least a controversy as 
to whether it was an innovation or merely a clarification (and the better 
view was that it was a clarification).  Years later, the interpretative 
controversy about the genesis of the exculpatory provision is not even 
referenced, and the revisionist view that the legislature had created 
something new when it passed the provision is allowed to color the Court’s 
conception of what is otherwise possible to accomplish under the statute.  
After all, if section 102(b)(7) was merely clarifying what firms could 
always have achieved through private-ordering, then by analogy the Gantler 
court might have better noted that officers could be exculpated by charter 
provision.  A similar revisionism threatens to infect courts’ thinking about 
the relationship between the PBC and the bounds of permissible private 




There is little direct discussion in the academic literature about the 
proper way to interpret whether menu options are suggestive or exclusive.  
What has been written notes the issue, but does not suggest its resolution.
92
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 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009). 
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 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009). 
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 Indeed, if a firm did adopt multi-stakeholder governance through a charter provision, as I 
have urged is permissible, it is not clear under the Gantler dicta whether the charter could 
also exculpate directors from duty of care liability to non-shareholding beneficiaries, since 
§102(b)(7) only references exculpation as to duties owed to shareholders.   
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 See, e.g., Daniel M. Häusermann, The Case Against Statutory Menus in Corporate Law, 
9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 45, 76 n.8 (2012) (“Whether a statutory menu is open-ended or 
closed-ended is a matter of statutory interpretation, to which the usual principles apply.”); 
Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out, supra note __ at 2051 (“[L]ike restaurant menus, legal 
menus might (in second-order fashion) indicate whether the menu options are exclusive--
or, like most restaurant menus, a legal menu might be silent as to whether it is exclusive.”).  




Per Llewellyn, the familiar canons of statutory interpretation reflect rather 
than resolve this analytic conundrum.
93
  The canon of expressio unius est 
exclusion alterius, which stands for the proposition that the “expression of 
one thing implies the exclusion of others”94 is possibly relevant.95  The 
expression of permissible ordering of non-stakeholder governance through 
the PBC implies that it cannot be accomplished otherwise in the General 
Corporation Law, where multi-stakeholder governance is not mentioned.    
However, as Scalia and Bryan note, “[v]irtually all the authorities who 
discuss the negative-implication canon emphasize that it must be applied 
with great caution, since its application depends so much on context.”96  
And right on cue, a frequently cited case in Delaware opines that “the 
Legislature does not necessarily admit that it did not by its prior enactment 
embrace a particular case by an amendment directly applicable to such 
case.”97 
 
We might have recourse to legislative history, but the only formal 
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 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules a 
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (arguing 
that for every familiar canon of statutory interpretation pointing the construction of a 
statute in one direction, another canon can be found pointing it in the opposite direction).  
The Delaware Supreme Court has adopted all of the usual canons of statutory 
interpretation.  The starting place is that unambiguous words are given exacting effect.  
Where there is ambiguity, the statute is interpreted to effectuate the legislature’s intent.  
Intent is gleaned from the overarching structure or purpose of the statute of which the 
language is a part.  Where such procedures are unavailing, recourse  may be had to 
legislative history.  See generally Fraternal Order of Police, Delaware-Wilmington Lodge 
No. 1 v. McLaughlin, 428 A.2d 1158, 1160 (Del. 1981) (summarizing Delaware 
jurisprudence on statutory interpretation). 
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 Scalia & Bryan, READING LAW, supra note __ at 107. 
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 Scalia & Bryan, READING LAW, supra note __ at 107.  One case discussed by Scalia and 
Garner in their treatment of this canon includes language, albeit drawn from an area afield 
from corporate law, which might apply to our question.  The case involved a challenge to 
the legitimacy of a state statute conferring on the governor the right to appoint temporary 
superior-court judges, where the state constitution provided that superior court judges 
“shall” be elected by both branches of the legislature.  Id. at 107 (discussing State ex rel. 
M’Cready v. Hunt, 2 Hill 1, 171 (S.C. Ct. App. 1834)).   In applying the canon of expressio 
unius, the Court struck down the statute, stating, rhetorically: “Does not the act of 
prescribing the mode, necessarily imply a prohibition to all other modes?” Id.   
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 Scalia & Bryan, READING LAW, supra note __ at 107. 
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 See Kennedy  v. Truss, Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County, 1 Terry 424, 13 
A.2d 431 (1940). 
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 DE LEGIS 122 (2013), 2013 DELAWARE LAWS CH. 122 (S.B. 47) (“Increasing interest in 
public benefit corporations necessitates their inclusion in the Code.  Committee Findings: 





The Delaware Corporation Law Council, a committee of the Delaware 
Bar Association which has special responsibility for proposing and vetting 
reforms to Delaware’s corporate law, was similarly indeterminate in the 
guidance it gave on the purpose of the statue. When the Corporation Law 
Council came forward in 2013 with its recommendation to adopt the PBC 
statute, the Council promulgated a FAQ document on the issue.
99
  The last 
question on the FAQ asks:  “Couldn’t this same goal be achieved through 
other types of entities?”  The answer is evasive: 
 
By using a Delaware corporation, entrepreneurs and investors who 
wish to pursue these goals will be able to rely on the long tradition 
of Delaware corporate law, as well as the Division of Corporations 
and the Delaware Judiciary, to provide a measure of stability and 




Another FAQ (indeed) was posed: “Can’t directors consider the interests of 
non-stockholders already?  Why is it necessary to adopt new legislation?”  
The answer states: 
 
While the DGCL provides broad authority for a corporation to 
adopt specifically tailored provisions, that authority does not 




But this does not answer the pressing question: does the General 
Corporation law not provide a clear path, or does it not provide a path?   
The language and structure of the statute does not clearly imply that 
private ordering of corporate beneficiary can now be accomplished only 
through the means prescribed by the public benefit corporation.     
 
Public Policy and Private Ordering 
                                                                                                                            
The committee found that allowing the creation of public benefit corporations in the State 
would potentially benefit Delaware by creating incentives for new corporations to form in-
state.”). 
99
 “Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: FAQ” (on file with author).  Curiously, while 
the document was originally posted online, it appears to no longer be available online.   
100
 See, e.g., “Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: FAQ” (on file with author).   
101
 “Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: FAQ,” supra note __. 




The Sterling decision states that charter provisions may deviate for 
common law corporate governance rules where they are neither contrary to 
a public policy implicit “in the General Corporation Law itself,”102 or a 
“public policy settled by the common law.”103  In the previous section I 
argued that neither the language nor the structure of the Delaware corporate 
clearly implies that the PBC is to be the exclusive, mandatory means of 
deviating from shareholder primacy.  Earlier I stated that there is nothing in 
the longstanding common law of shareholder primacy to suggest that it is 
immutable, and there is as yet no common law relating to the public benefit 
corporation.  However, as we struggles to understand whether  the PBC 
should be considered the exclusive means of departing from shareholder 
primacy, let us here consider general public policy justifications for 
mandatory, exclusive corporate law rules, and see if they may shed some 
light on this case.  This theoretical perspective may shed light on the 
positive doctrinal assessment, and may aid assessment of what kind of 
reforms are desirable, as policymakers confront the conundrum I have 
surfaced here. 
 
There are three basic justifications for having mandatory corporate law 
rules.  First, mandatory rules might protect vulnerable parties from 
exploitation that might occur under a private-ordering regime.  Second, and 
mandatory rules might protect against the externalization of harms to third-
parties occasioned by other people’s private agreements.  Third, mandatory 
rules may induce efficient, socially desirable network effects that would not 
be realized in a system that countenanced private-ordering.  The trouble 
with immutable corporate law rules is that they stifle autonomy and 
innovation, threatening to leave us stuck with government designs that 
might have been established in ignorance, or through rent-seeking.
104
  The 
principles of a free society and the teachings of economics therefore 
prescribe a presumption against mandatory rules, with the burden of 
persuasion placed on advocates for them. 
 
With respect to the exploitation justification, commentators have long 
noted that the separation of ownership and control in corporate operations 
creates a dynamic in which corporate directors can malinger or thieve at the 
expensive of shareholders, who are too distant and rationally ignorant of 
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 Sterling, 93 A.2d at 117. 
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 Sterling, 93 A.2d at 117. 
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 See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporate Law, supra note __ at 1525. 




corporate affairs to stop it.
105
  Corporate law, and its crown jewel the 
shareholder primacy norm, is designed to mitigate this agency problem.  
Private alteration of corporate law’s prescribed terms threatens to 
reintroduce opportunities for shareholder exploitation that the law seeks to 
restrain.  The rigid requirements of the public benefit corporation may be 
designed to protect shareholders from corporate operations that would 
otherwise waste or redistribute to other groups too much of what should go 
to the stockholders.  However, in writings undertaken without reference to 
the beneficiary issue, the most influential mainstream corporate scholars 
have doubted that private ordering of corporate governance standards really 
can exploit shareholders.  The capital markets are highly efficient, and 
corporate governance terms that create greater risk of shareholder 
exploitation are priced accordingly.  Professional analysts scrutinize and 
accurately price atypical terms in a corporate charter, and deviation from 
shareholder-primacy will be subject to whatever discounts the market 
deems appropriate.  If firms want to exploit their shareholders with bad 
charter rules, the firm’s costs of capital will be greater.  Shareholders get 
what they pay for, not more, and not less.
106
   
These arguments are most believable in the context of large publicly 
traded corporations where professional analysts actively scrutinize 
governance terms.
107
  This argument may ironically suggest that private-
ordering of corporate terms is more acceptable in the context of large 
publicly traded firms than in small, closely held firms, where unusual terms 
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 See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 849 (1776) (“The directors . . . being 
the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance which the partners in a 
copartnery frequently watch over their own”); see also ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (seminal modern statement of 
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 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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 Eisenberg makes that important observation that the argument that pro-management, or, 
for our purposes, pro-worker or pro-consumer, terms are accurately priced through IPOs, 
even if correct, is an argument about fairness, not efficiency.  See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, __ (1989).   It is an argument 
that shareholders got what they paid for, and are not being robbed, but it does not suggest 
that such rules are desirable in terms of most effectively aggregating and deploying capital 
in a scarce, and sometimes hungry, world.  Eisenberg also notes that courts sometimes 
refuse to enforce contract terms that upset the reasonable expectations of consumers even 
where the terms demonstrably lowered the price to the consumer.  The examples he gives 
involve insurance contracts, which excluded conventionally covered items  in homeowner 
policies.   
Eisenberg, Structure of Corporation Law, supra note __ at 1519. 




may be inaccurately priced or result in more onerous surprise as against 
undiversified owners.  One would usually assume that the small context 
would be better suited to particularized bargaining, but where complicated 
terms are at issue, the small context may call for uniformity or 
immutability.  Presently, most Public Benefit Corporations are small or 
mid-sized ventures.  There are, as yet, no publicly traded PBCs.
108
     
  Before a mandatory, exclusive deviation from shareholder primacy can 
be justified out of fear of shareholder exploitation, we must consider that 
exploitation is a widespread concern in corporate operations, and in some 
ways, a zero-sum concern.  Critics of prevailing corporate law have argued 
that the shareholder primacy norm incentivizes firms to manipulate or 
overreach when dealing with non-shareholders (for example, by skimping 
on worker and consumer safety, product quality, or environmental impact) 
in ways workers and consumers will find difficult to observe.  Advocates of 
shareholder primacy insist that such dynamics, which they admit are 
predictable, should be restrained by operation of external government 
regulation.  However, the economic theory of regulation should lead us to 
predict that firms will operate in the political sphere to stunt the 
development of such regulations, or worse, turn them to their own use.  The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission gives constitutional dimension to the failure of shareholder 
primacy theory, as it holds that firms have a constitutional right to operate 
in the political sphere.
109
  Some scholars claim such “bad contracts,” will be 
priced-right in labor and consumer markets just as surely as bad corporate 
governance terms will be.  But then again, if labor or consumer markets are 
bereft of the kinds of market-makers who routinely scrutinize charter terms 
for capital, or if labor or consumer markets are small, as the market for a 
small firm’s stock may be small, then such exploitative terms may not be 
accurately priced for workers or consumers.  Privately-ordered deviation 
from shareholder primacy may make shareholders more vulnerable, but it 
may make workers and consumers less vulnerable.  Mandatory rules may 
make shareholders less vulnerable, but it makes workers and consumers 
more vulnerable.  The flipability or indeterminacy of the exploitation point 
should therefore counsel in favor of freedom to privately order corporate 
beneficiary.  
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Assessment of the “externalities” justification for mandatory rules in 
this context leads to a similar conclusion.  There are good reasons to believe 
that shareholder primacy has externality problems.  It is hard to see that 
such problems would be worse under a multi-stakeholder governance 
regime.  Therefore, if deviation from shareholder primacy seems likely to 
mitigate externalization, then flexibility to adopt different governance goals 
should be permitted, rather than deviation being permitted only though one 
mandatory form.   
The best theoretical argument for a mandatory, exclusive form of 
opting-out of shareholder primacy in corporate governance may be a  
“network effects” justification.  Working outside of the question of 
corporate beneficiary, Jeffery Gordon argued that mandatory corporate law 
rules should be maintained where they constitute a public good, in the sense 
that their repeated use, and repeated litigation about them, diminishes 
uncertainty about the use of the standard form, and reduces the cost of using 
the form.
110
  While allowing mutable terms may improve the situation of the 
individuals who privately order, it may diminish overall social utility by 
raising the costs to others of using the default form.  Gordon also 
highlighted the social costs borne in connection with litigation over 
uncertain, privately-ordered deviations from standard forms.  Deploying 
these arguments in the present context, it may be said that allowing 
deviation by private ordering of corporate beneficiary, or allowing tinkering 
within the Public Benefit Corporation form, may result in fewer non-
shareholder primacy firms than if the PBC were the only option.  This may 
be especially important where the charter is describing the relationship of 
the firm to multiple stakeholders, for whom the capital markets cannot be 
expected to vet peculiar charter terms.   
Gordon’s “network effects” arguments were roundly dismissed by 
strong advocates of private-ordering in corporate affairs.  Butler and 
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Ribstein insisted that since standard terms have already acquired a high 
level predictability, their utility would not be diminished by allowing 
greater experimentation.
111
  This, of course, is not true in the public benefit 
corporation area, where even the standard form has been relatively untested.  
More relevant to the PBC context, Butler and Ribstein argued that the 
network effects of a “standard” form would still be achieved if the form 
were highly desirable and voluntarily used by numerous parties.  They 
conclude that “Gordon’s argument would stifle the most valuable form of 
innovation—the evolution of new terms to replace a standard form that 
would die if it were not mandated. . . . [M]andating terms on the basis of the 
‘public good’ theory would impose significant social costs.”112  Gordon’s 
social costs of litigation were also rejected by Bernie Black, who noted that 
“the negative externality of costs borne by the state will be offset by the 
positive externality of greater certainty to future users of the new term.”113  
These critiques of the network justification for mandatory rules seems 
applicable in the PBC context.  If the PBC is a desirable form, it will be 
used and its use will become ever cheaper over time as precedents make it 
more predictable.  Such network effects will not be unduly compromised by 
allowing experimentation by those who prefer another approach.  
It would seem that in addition to the statutory scheme itself not 
implying that the public benefit corporation is the only permissible form of 
deviation from shareholder primacy, broader public policies implicit in the 
common law (and beyond) also do not clearly indicate that freedom to  
private-order corporate beneficiary through corporate chartering should be 
strictly regulated.    
Actual Flexibility: Mid-stream Adoption of Multi-
Stakeholder Governance 
  
Suppose that it were permissible to privately order multi-stakeholder 
governance in a corporate charter.  Is it permissible to amend the charter of 
an existing shareholder-primacy corporation to adopt multi-stakeholder 
governance?  In the Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Easterbrook and 
Fischel insisted that the contractual nature of the firm should lead corporate 
law to look suspiciously on “mid-stream” changes:   
                                                 
111
 Butler & Ribstein, Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties, supra note __. 
112
 Butler & Ribstein, Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties, supra note __ at __. 
113
 Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 578.  Black adds: “And the state has 
a simple remedy for any remaining net external cost: it can charge a higher price for 
providing judges and courthouses.”  Id. 





If the venture at its formation is designed in the ordinary fashion – 
employees and debt investors holding right to fixed payoffs and 
equity investors holding a residual claim to profits, which the 
other participants promise to maximize – that is a binding promise.  
If the firm suddenly acquires a newspaper and declares that it is no 
longer interested in profit, the equity investors have a legitimate 
complaint.  It is a complaint for breach of contract, not for derogation 
from some ideal of corporate governance.
114
 
But their conclusion begs the question: have shareholders in firms with the 
default shareholder primacy form of corporate governance entered into a 
contract where that rule is immutable, or have they entered into a contract 
where that rule can be altered?   
Delaware provides that by default amendments can be adopted by a 
majority of shareholders.
115
  The charter may specify a greater threshold, 
but not a lower one.  Section 242(a) of the Delaware corporate code states 
that a corporate charter can be amended to include “such provisions as 
would be lawful . . . in an original certificate of incorporation.”116 The 
section states that “in particular, and without limitation on such general 
power of amendment,” a charter may be amended so as “[t]o change . .  
enlarge or diminish the nature of its business or its corporate powers and 
purposes.”117  The amendment power is thus expansive; it contemplates that 
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Under Delaware’s code, only the board can initiate an amendment, and 
they do so by “adopt[ing] a resolution setting forth the amendment 
proposed, declaring its advisability, and . . . calling a special meeting of the 
stockholders entitled to vote in respect thereof.”119  But if the default 
corporate governance rule is shareholder primacy, as I insist that it is, then 
there would seem to be no legitimate path through which a board could 
initiate an amendment to deviate from shareholder primacy.  Under the 
shareholder primacy norm, the Board can only pursue an amendment that it 
considers to be in the best interests of the shareholders, and not any other 
group.  
However, the Public Benefit Corporation statute does contemplate that 
an ordinary Delaware corporation could amend its charter to become a 
Public Benefit Corporation, and section 368 specifically states that such 
amendment rules are applicable to already existing ordinary corporations.  
Therefore, it is now permissible for an ordinary corporate board to advise 
amending the corporate charter in order to deviate from shareholder 
primacy.  This truly is a new bit of flexibility introduced by the PBC.
120
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When the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation statutes was first passed 
in 2012, it required a 90 percent vote of every effected class of stock, even 
if the stock was otherwise non-voting, before an ordinary firm could 
become a public benefit corporation.
121
  But in 2015, the statute was 
changed to allow an ordinary firm to become a Public Benefit Corporation 
with only a two-thirds affirmative vote of the voting shares (rather than 
each class of shares).
122
   
Under the original version of the PBC statute, shareholders of ordinary 
corporations who dissented from a vote to become a public benefit 
corporations were entitled to appraisal rights. After the 2015 amendments, 
appraisal rights are only available if the stock is not publicly traded.
123
  
Interestingly, the statute states that if an ordinary corporation is being 
merged into a “domestic or foreign public benefit corporation or similar 
entity,”124 then dissenters are entitled to appraisal rights.  This “similar 
entity” verbiage may signal, or at least provide a statutory foothold for, the 
idea that corporation deviation from the shareholder primacy might come in 
many shapes and sizes, including privately ordered multi-stakeholder forms.      
These rules would appear to control over a provision in the charter that 
had stricter amendment standards.  Suppose you have a corporation that 
requires a 90 percent shareholder vote to amend the charter, which then 
gains a 2/3 vote to become a public benefit corporation.  The public benefit 
corporation statute does not say that the 2/3 vote is required unless 
otherwise provided in the non-PBC charter of the firm undertaking the 
transformation.  So in this sense, the PBC clearly reduces flexibility.  Or 
consider what effect there would be if a firm had a charter that stated that it 
could become a PBC upon the vote of a simple majority of its shareholders.  
Such a provision would apparently not control over the 2/3 percent that the 
PBC requires. 
                                                                                                                            
shutter at the passage of the amendment provisions of the Delaware public benefit 
corporation statute suggests either that the provision was not understood, or that they were 
understood to be not very important,  because they are highly unlikely to be used.  See infra 
text accompanying notes __-__ (critiquing the PBC statute for its triviality). 
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Public Benefit Corporations may also disavow its public benefit status 
with “approval of 2/3 of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to 
vote.”125 Another question that the Public Benefit Corporation statute 
proposes is whether or not there may be demand for any other kind of 
voting requirement other than a 2/3 voting requirement for dropping benefit 
status.  If a corporation had privately-ordered into multi-stakeholder 
governance, rather than using the PBC, then they could presumably drop 
multi-stakeholder governance in favor of shareholder primacy (or consumer 
primacy, etc.) by a majority vote of the shareholders, or through whatever 
means of amendment were otherwise privately-ordered into the articles.   
Menus Matter  for Corporate Experimentation 
If my view is correct, that it has all along been possible for promoters to 
contract-to the public benefit corporation, the adoption of the statute may 
nevertheless be significant.  When the state showcases a “menu option,” 
people are relieved of the burden of coming up with it themselves, and are 
given assurances that this kind of ordering is in fact lawful.  If it was clear 
that the menu was merely one option, rather than an exclusive option, then 
it could also stand as a foundation or starting point around which people 
tinker or “hack” their own alterations.    
A nice empirical study by Yair Listokin shows how menus can matter in 
corporate law.
126
  Listokin analyzed a “natural experiment” that took place 
through the proliferation of anti-takeover legislation in the 1980s.  In a short 
period of time, many states adopted rules relating to a relatively standard set 
of anti-takeover measures, including “fair price,” “business combination,” 
and “control share acquisition” rules.127  Different states, however, adopted 
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different defaults.  A majority of states adopted the antitakeover rules as 
defaults, and explicitly authorized firms to opt-out by charter amendment.  
Other states, however, passed legislation which explicitly authorized firms 
to adopt anti-takeover rules, but did not establish such rules as a default.  
Some states did not pass any anti-takeover legislation, but Listokin assumes 
that privately-ordered anti-takeover rules would have been permissible in 
such states (despite the absence of a statutory “menu option”).  Finally, a 
few states adopted mandatory anti-takeover rules.
128
    
Listokin found that the default rules and menu options had significant 
effects.  For example, 98 percent of firms chartered in states with a “fair 
price” default rule stuck with the default.  In states with a fair price “menu 
option,” fifty percent of firms opted into the “fair price” rule.  In states with 
no default or menu option, but where Listokin presumes “fair price” could 




For present purposes, the important conclusion is that “menu options” 
matter. Listokin argues that menu options “reduce transaction costs by 
reducing the amount of drafting and negotiation required to adopt anti-
takeover protections. . . . Menus also create a focal point that engenders the 
formation of a network effect, which also reduces transaction costs.”130 
Listokin claims that these results “contradict the triviality hypothesis” and 
that “[t]he failure of the triviality hypothesis suggests that legislatures 
should continue to produce corporate law.”131   
Another example of the power of menu options can be seen in 
connection with the previously discussed exculpation provision of section 
102(b)(7).  After the provision was introduced into the Delaware corporate 
code nearly every major firm adopted “exculpation” clauses in their 
charters, rushing past the invitation to “limit” directorial liability into a full 
embrace of “eliminate[ing]” it altogether.  If opting-out of duty of care 
liability was always available before section 102(b)(7), then why did so few 
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firms do so in their charters before the Delaware legislature put in on the 
menu?    Possibly, prior to the Smith v. Van Gorkom,
132
 corporate lawyers 
did not think formal exculpation in the charter was necessary, because they 
assumed that the “business judgments rule” was so expansive that directors 
would never really be held liable for duty of care damages on any 
imaginable set of facts.  But given the ease with which exculpation can be 
literally written into a charter, and that director’s stood only to gain if 
court’s held such provision valid, and lost nothing if they were invalid, the 
“they didn’t think they needed it” explanation for the infrequency of 
privately-ordered exculpation before 1985 seems at least incomplete.
133
   
 
Sometimes, it seems that it takes a long time for practitioners to realize 
that an innovation is both permissible and desirable.  Twenty-dollar bills, 
apparently, sometimes lay around on sidewalks for decades before the state 
points them out, and someone picks them up.  The explicit statutory 
invitation to completely exculpate directors from liability may have 
signaled a wisdom or aided the development of a business and legal norm 
that would not otherwise have existed.
134
  Thus, even if the Public Benefit 
Corporation is merely a “menu option,” the state’s provision of such an 
option may create a world in which there are more multi-stakeholder 
governance corporations than would otherwise exist.  Menus appear to be 
important in this context: witness the emergence of many more non-
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IV. PRESCRIPTIONS, NARROW AND BROAD 
 
Narrow, Plausible Prescription:  Seek Clarification 
 
Corporate social responsibility activists urging state legislatures to adopt 
Public Benefit Corporation statutes have insisted that these statutes are 
necessary because of uncertainty regarding the viability of altering the 
standard corporate form to achieve the multi-stakeholder governance they 
insist investors, workers, and consumers desire.
136
 A better approach would 
have been to petition the legislature for clarity on the point of private 
ordering, rather than petitioning for an entirely new form that only more 
deeply obscures the private ordering question.  It is not too late to pursue 
legislative clarification, perhaps with an amendment to the General 
Corporation Law that specified: “nothing in this sub-chapter should be 
interpreted to preclude a corporation other than a public benefit corporation 
from specifying in its articles of incorporation that the corporation and its 
directors owe obligations to non-shareholders or other public interests.”137  
Along these lines, it is also time that Delaware give statutory imprimatur to 
the common law rule of shareholder primacy, if this is indeed Delaware’s 
preference, along with clear language that it is mutable.
138
  It would also be 
desirable to alter the public benefit corporation statute to make it more 
susceptible to private-ordering.  There is little risk not otherwise 
encountered by investors, workers, or consumers, to providing greater and 
genuine flexibility in the design of social enterprise.   
 
Short of legislative reform, it also is still possible that in future litigation 
that touches on corporate purpose of ordinary corporations, a jurist will 
point the way, or throw down the gauntlet, with respect to mutability of 
shareholder primacy.  The current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, Leo E. Strine, Jr.,  for example, has evinced significant interest in the 
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subject of corporate purpose.
139
  This interest, combined with business and 
legal developments, will undoubtedly result in important pronouncement on 
these questions in the coming years.    When the next Craigslist case comes 
about, as it surely will in this era in which large firms are eager to cloak 
themselves in the wool of social responsibility, and may forget the duties of 
the shareholders’ shepherd, Chancery, or the Delaware Supreme Court, 
should speak and clarify its views on whether, and how, shareholder 
primacy in corporate governance can be altered.
140
   
Aspirational Prescription: Change the Default Rule 
If the impetus behind the Public Benefit Corporation is to provide a 
vehicle through which holders of capital can invest in business corporations 
that pursue profit in balance with other interests, then the statute satisfies 
the charge.
141
  If, however, the motivation behind the Public Benefit 
Corporation is to offer a cure to the legal and incentive structures that cause 
shareholder primacy corporations to predictably operate in socially 
irresponsible ways,
142
 then the PBC statute is entirely inadequate.  It is not a 
serious response to the problems engendered by shareholder primacy, 
because capital clearly prefers the superior profits that are available in the 
shareholder primacy firm, to the more “balanced” profits that are available 
in a PBC.  Even if the PBC’s do attract significant capital, it cannot be 
expected that they will displace the socially deleterious effects of for-profit 
corporations.
143
   
 
If shareholder primacy in corporate governance is mandatory, then from 
the shareholder perspective its mandatory nature is probably trivial, since 
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this is the rule that capital would prefer in any event.  But even if it is 
mutable, this mutability is largely trivial to both shareholders and non-
shareholders, but for different reasons. It is trivial to shareholders because 
they do not want to change it, and it is trivial to non-shareholders because 
they cannot plausibly change it.  The default rule of corporate governance, 
created by government, cannot plausibly be altered by widely dispersed, 
cognitively limited, rationally ignorant workers and consumers.
144
  Firms 
exist because transactions costs are high, so we cannot expect that it will be 
easy for stakeholders to opt-out of the default rules that corporate law 
provides.
145
     
The Public Benefit Corporation “menu option,” in its present form, 
therefore, is not a serious response to the problems associated with 
shareholder primacy firms in our society.  Indeed, it may make matters 
worse by encouraging for-profit firms to behave more rapaciously on the 
theory that benefit corporations are there for shareholders who want socially 
responsible investing.
146
  It is more likely that ordinary corporations will be 
content to blur the boundary, so as not to lose market-share to PBCs, while 
the most rapacious kinds of companies will use it as an excuse not to even 
pretend to worry about social responsibility.  The Benefit Corporation 
model also threatens to create a social policy “mirage” of responsiveness to 
the problems attendant to shareholder-primacy firms.  This mirage can help 
legislators persuade themselves, and the public, that the law had responded 
to the problem associated with corporations.  In this sense, creating benefit 
corporations is worse than doing nothing, because at least if nothing had 
been done nobody could think that something significant had been done.        
I have argued that the weakness of shareholder primacy theory counsels 
in favor of a reform of corporate governance law to require corporate 
directors to operate in the interests of multiple-stakeholders, including 
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workers and consumers, rather than shareholders alone.
147
  An effective 
multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime could only be established 
by making it the default rule.
148
  And this could only be accomplished 
through federal preemption of state chartering.
149
  Such preemption, 
however, would not necessarily have to foreclose all experimentation or 
private ordering in business design.  Our policymaking choices are not so 
stark.    First, federal preemption might only apply to very large firms, with 
small operations allowed the flexibility of state regimes.  For the largest 
corporations, we could require through federal legislation that boards at a 
minimum understand that they are empowered to actively contemplate the 
effect of corporate action on non-shareholders.  Second, the federal multi-
stakeholder governance standard might merely be a default rule, which 
firms could opt-out of through a given set of procedures.  Consideration of 
the means through which a multi-stakeholder default could be avoided 
opens up a wide array of possibilities, which might be deployed in different 
contexts.  As Ayers reminds us, in the area of defaults, policymakers are not 
limited to deciding between mandatory or mutable rules, rather, once 
having decided that a rule is mutable, another “lever” of policymaking is 






Proponents of private-ordering must lay the intellectual groundwork 
now to stunt the evolution of an idea that the only kind of multi-stakeholder 
governance that is allowed in Delaware is that which is prescribed in the 
PBC.  The Delaware General Corporation Law supplies a default rule of 
shareholder primacy in corporate governance.  This rule should be 
understood as alterable through private ordering in the corporate charter.  
The emergence of the Public Benefit Corporation challenges but does not 
upend this conclusion.  The Public Benefit Corporation should be 
understood as a “menu option,” which promoters may choose to pursue a 
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highly specific form of multi-stakeholder governance, but promoters remain 
free to order “off the menu,” and get their own multi-stakeholder corporate 
design.  Delaware jurists or the Delaware legislature would be prudent to 
explicitly sustain these conclusions through case law or statutory 
clarification. The PBC itself should be reformed to make its key terms 
default rules, subject to private-ordering.   
A broader-reaching reform which may be pursued over the longer-term 
would see the federal government overturning the shareholder primacy 
governance default in favor of a multi-stakeholder presumption which could 
only be altered through an amendment process that involved all corporate 
stakeholders, and not just shareholders.   
